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 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES
 Vol. 56, No. 7, November 2004, 1059-1080
 Carfax Publishing
 Taylor & Francis Group
 The Prospects for Regional Economic
 Integration Between China and the Five
 Central Asian Countries
 HSIU-LING WU & CHIEN-HSUN CHEN
 AS THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION CONTINUES, there is a trend towards
 regional economic integration. By eliminating the barriers to trade between the
 participant countries, regional economic integration encourages efficient allocation of
 production factors and a more effective division of labour, while also helping to boost
 the efficiency of the regional economy as a whole and enhancing social welfare. For
 countries seeking to enhance their international competitiveness, efforts to reduce the
 level of risk attached to trading and investment activity need to be combined with
 pro-active participation in regional economic collaboration (Hanson, 1998).
 In the case of China, with the ongoing opening of its markets and the rapid
 economic development the country has achieved in recent years, there has been
 significant progress in economic collaboration between China and other countries in
 the region. By participating actively in regional economic collaboration, China can
 strengthen both its economic links with other developing nations and its political ties
 with these countries (Wang, 2003). At the same time, collaborating with one another
 on the basis of mutual benefit and reciprocity helps to facilitate involvement in the
 process of globalisation; China's active participation in regional economic collabora-
 tion therefore has political, diplomatic and economic benefits.
 China's strategy for regional economic collaboration emphasises the leveraging of
 its geographical location, focusing on pro-active involvement in various forms of
 collaborative activity with neighbouring countries. The main emphasis in China's
 economic collaboration efforts is thus on the Asia Pacific region (Song & Chen,
 2002). The main forms of collaboration adopted include participation in the Asia
 Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework for the liberalisation of trade and
 investment and for economic and technology co-operation, collaboration with the
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the basis of the Framework
 Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Between ASEAN and the
 People's Republic of China, and the development of a collaborative relationship with
 the five Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
 Turkmenistan.
 Central Asia occupies a strategic position within the Eurasian landmass, linking
 Europe and Asia together. It also possesses abundant reserves of petroleum and
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 natural gas. Like China, the Central Asian countries are economies in transition. Their
 geographical proximity to one another and the high potential for complementarity
 between their economies have encouraged the rapid development of bilateral econ-
 omic and trading relationships. The question is whether or not the rapid growth of
 economic ties will lead to economic integration. This study will examine the paths
 that the development of economic and trading relationships between China and the
 Central Asian countries might take, and scrutinises the prospects for economic
 integration between them. The article first analyses China's strategic goals of
 economic collaboration with the nations of Central Asia; next it explores the patterns
 of bilateral trade, and seeks to isolate the important features of this trade. It then
 evaluates Chinese investment in Central Asia, and discusses the problems the Central
 Asian countries have faced in trying to attract foreign investment, as well as the
 negative impact these factors might have on the promotion of economic integration
 between China and Central Asia. The final section contains the study's conclusions.
 China's strategic goals of economic collaboration with the five Central Asian
 countries
 The five Central Asian countries are all located in close proximity to China, and
 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share land borders with China's Xinjiang
 province; the combined length of their common borders with China is over 3,000 km.
 On 26 April 1996 China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed the
 Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in Shanghai. It was agreed that
 the leaders of the five signatory nations would meet annually; this became known as
 the Shanghai Five mechanism. On 24 April 1997 the same five countries signed the
 Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions. According to this
 agreement, military forces in border areas would be reduced to a purely defensive
 level in line with the amicable relations between the countries concerned. The
 signatory nations agreed that they would not use military force or the threat of
 military force against one another, that no attacks would be launched by the military
 forces stationed in border regions, and that the troops and weaponry stationed within
 100 km of the common borders would be reduced. Timetables and methods would be
 set for the force reduction, and implementation would be monitored. This agreement
 would continue until 31 December 2020, and it could be extended by agreement
 between the signatory nations (Xia, 2001). The signing of these two agreements
 reflects the amicable relations that now exist between the five countries concerned,
 and is the fruit of the mutual trust and collaboration based on mutual benefit that has
 been established between them.
 Since 1997 there have been major changes in the Shanghai Five mechanism. The
 scope covered by the negotiations between the five countries has expanded. Beside
 their discussion of border issues, there has also been a broad exchange of views on
 political, diplomatic, military, security and economic issues relating not only to the
 five countries concerned but also to global affairs in general, along with efforts to
 form consensus, provide mutual support and implement collaborative activities. In
 particular, there have been joint declarations stressing the five countries' determi-
 nation to strengthen regional security and promote economic collaboration. Having
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 begun by focusing on issues relating to border area force reduction and strengthening
 mutual trust in the military sphere, the links between China and the Central Asian
 countries have now expanded to include economic collaboration and cultural ex-
 change. The increasingly close links with Central Asia stem naturally from China's
 policy of fostering friendly relations with neighbouring countries.
 The strategic significance of Central Asia vis-ai-vis China's development in the
 twenty-first century can be summarised as follows.
 1. Having won their independence during the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
 the five Central Asian countries have yet to establish democratic political systems and
 market economies (Blank, 2004). By and large, they have retained the authoritarian
 attitudes that characterised the Soviet Union (Kuchukeeva & O'Loughlin, 2003).
 Governance is weak, corruption rampant and crime on the increase; coupled with the
 complex mixture of ethnic groups that inhabit the five countries, these factors have
 led to political instability. The security situation in Central Asia could have a major
 impact on long-term security in north-west China and on whether China's Great
 Western Development project (xibu da kaifa) can be implemented successfully;
 eventually, it could affect the political stability and economic development of China
 as a whole (Zhang, 2003). At the same time, promoting economic development in
 Xinjiang by fostering trade links with the Central Asian countries is seen as an
 important method of maintaining social stability in north-west China.
 2. Central Asia will play an important role in China's efforts to escape from its
 strategic encirclement by the US. Since the reform process began in China, China's
 economy has grown rapidly, and overall national might has increased significantly.
 China is now able to present itself as a major power, one that is able to exercise a
 steadily increasing degree of influence throughout the world. China's rapid develop-
 ment and growing international stature have become a source for concern in the US,
 which has started to position China as a potential strategic competitor. In order to
 protect itself against the possible threat from China and preserve US hegemony in the
 Asia Pacific region and the rest of the world, the US has gradually been increasing
 the size of the forces it has deployed in regions surrounding China, and leveraging the
 influence that it enjoys in these regions to curb China's development. By maintaining
 control over the transport routes that connect China to other parts of the world, the
 US can put China under pressure.
 Central Asia's strategic importance and abundant natural resources have long made
 it a focus of competition between the world's leading powers. The level of US
 influence in Central Asia began to increase in the early 1990s. However, US foreign
 policy with respect to the former Soviet Union continued to focus heavily on Russia,
 with Central Asia tending to be marginalised. US involvement in the region did not
 begin to increase significantly until the mid-1990s, when there was a pronounced
 increase in US investment in the region, as well as in the provision of economic
 development aid and military assistance. Political and military ties between the US
 and the Central Asian countries now began to develop rapidly. However, vigorous
 efforts by China and Russia to increase their influence over the Central Asian nations
 led to a slackening off in US activity in the region in the late 1990s (Kubicek, 2004).
 China and Russia were in competition not only with the US but also with each other.
 Following the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001 the US established
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 military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, along with a logistics facility in
 Kazakhstan. This was the first time that US military forces had been deployed in
 Central Asia. With US influence increasing in the political, military and economic
 spheres, the ability of the US to influence the Central Asian countries' foreign policy
 has also grown; China's ability to influence the Central Asian nations may be
 constrained as a result.
 With no wish to have the attainment of its strategic objective of raising China's
 international competitiveness affected by US deployments in Central Asia, China has
 stepped up its efforts to strengthen its ties with the Central Asian countries. If China
 is to put an end to its strategic encirclement by the US, Central Asia is one of the
 areas it will need to focus on. Not only will the development of closer trading
 relations with the Central Asian countries help China to break free from the
 stranglehold the US has on it, it will also create the conditions needed for China to
 secure more freedom of action on the international stage.
 3. Central Asia represents an important starting point for China in the expansion of
 its international influence. As an emerging power, China is experiencing a broadening
 in the scope of its national interest as its economy grows and its relations with other
 nations become closer. China wants very much to increase its international influence,
 thereby gaining a greater say in world affairs. Lying just beyond China's borders as
 it does, Central Asia will inevitably have an important role to play in China's
 geopolitical strategy.
 China's purchasing of large amounts of energy from the Central Asian nations can
 be viewed as one of the ways in which China is expanding its influence in the region.
 While Russia's stature has diminished, the impressive performance of China's
 economy since the reform process began has made China a model for economic
 planners in other countries. These countries hope that Chinese assistance will help
 them to share in the rapid economic development that so many countries in the Asia
 Pacific region have achieved. China is taking advantage of this situation to expand its
 ties with the Central Asian countries in such a way as to maximise the political and
 economic benefits to China and increase the degree of influence that China is able to
 exercise in the region.
 Developing friendly relations with the Central Asian nations will provide China
 with a foundation on which it can build to strengthen its ties with Russia and the
 countries of South Asia and the Middle East. Given the potential for Central Asia to
 function as a bridge between China and Europe, building ties with the Central Asian
 countries also has great significance for the development of Sino-European trading
 links.
 4. The abundant natural resources of Central Asia also have enormous strategic
 significance for China's future economic development. The rapid growth of China's
 economy means that demand for energy is rising all the time. If China is to maintain
 its current high rate of economic growth, it will need an adequate supply of energy
 sources. In 2001 China's petroleum consumption totaled 231 million tons, having
 doubled over the previous ten years. China now accounts for 6.6% of the world's oil
 consumption, a percentage exceeded by only two other countries (the US and Japan).
 Viewed on a per capita basis, China's own domestic energy resources are very
 limited; on their own, they will not be enough for China to maintain its current rate
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 of economic growth. China is thus obliged to look for external sources of energy
 supply that are steady, secure and large enough to meet China's needs.
 Not only does Central Asia possess extensive energy reserves, it is also located
 close to China; it is therefore only to be expected that China should want to promote
 collaboration with the Central Asian countries in the energy sphere. Since achieving
 independence, these countries have been working actively to develop economic ties
 with countries outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including
 China.' Collaboration with other countries in the area of energy production provides
 one way for the Central Asian nations to achieve economic development; by
 exporting energy they can secure the capital and foreign exchange needed for
 economic development. There are therefore strong incentives for both China and the
 Central Asian countries to collaborate on energy development and utilisation.
 5. Central Asia has an important part to play in China's strategy of promoting
 regional economic collaboration. As a rising power seeking to win a place for itself
 on the global stage, China needs to strengthen economic collaboration with neigh-
 bouring countries and regions. By promoting regional economic collaboration, China
 can ensure that its own economic interests are served. As an important neighbouring
 region, Central Asia was bound to become a major focus of China's efforts to
 promote regional economic integration (Deng & Moore, 2004). Currently, the level of
 economic collaboration between China and the Central Asian countries is still
 relatively low, although viewed in a more positive light this means that the potential
 for developing such collaboration is enormous.
 There is a high level of complementarity between the Chinese economy and the
 economies of the Central Asian countries; China needs Central Asia's energy and
 related products, while Central Asia needs China's light industrial products, food-
 stuffs and home appliances. The development of communication routes along the
 length of the Eurasian landmass will enhance the prospects for successful economic
 collaboration between China and the Central Asian nations, helping to promote
 bilateral trade.
 6. China is promoting collaboration with Central Asia across a broad spectrum of
 areas, so as to ensure the long-term stability of China's relations with the Central
 Asian nations. Since the 1990s both China and its Central Asian neighbours have had
 to deal with the threat posed by separatist movements, religious fundamentalism and
 terrorism. This shared threat has stimulated the development of closer political and
 security ties, resulting in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
 (SCO) collaboration mechanism. However, economic and trading relations between
 China and the Central Asian countries are still not as close as those between China
 and its other neighbours. This is partly because the investment environment in Central
 Asia is a relatively unattractive one, and partly because of the region's unsatisfactory
 transport infrastructure. Interaction is thus still largely confined to the political and
 security spheres, with economic collaboration lagging far behind. This situation is not
 favourable to the maintenance of long-term stability in the relationship between China
 and the Central Asian nations. China hopes that it can use its political ties with
 Central Asia (which have taken concrete shape in the Shanghai Cooperation Organis-
 ation) as a foundation for developing more intensive economic collaboration, so that,
 beside helping to maintain security in the region, the Shanghai Cooperation Organis-
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 ation will also come to serve as an important mechanism for promoting economic
 cooperation and thereby have a positive impact on economic development in both
 China and Central Asia. Both the Chinese and the Central Asian economies are
 aggressively pursuing economic transformation and market opening, and their
 respective governments are encouraging individual companies to undertake collabora-
 tion and exchange; there is thus an excellent opportunity for the development of
 regional economic cooperation.
 On 26 April 1994, during a visit to Central Asia, Chinese Premier Li Peng declared
 the following guidelines on which the development of economic collaboration
 between China and the Central Asian nations should be based: conformity to the
 principles of equality and mutual benefit; diversification of the types of collaboration
 adopted; practicality and making effective use of local resources; improvement of the
 transport infrastructure to create a new Silk Road; developing multilateral collabora-
 tion and promoting common development; and provision of small amounts of aid to
 the Central Asian nations by China.
 On 5 July 2000 the leaders of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
 Tajikistan met in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, for a fifth summit at which a
 consensus was reached on the promotion of friendly collaboration between the five
 nations and on promoting the Shanghai Five mechanism. It was agreed that the five
 countries would collaborate on combating separatism, religious extremism and inter-
 national terrorism which threatened the region's security, stability and development,
 and that a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation should be established to serve as a
 regional mechanism for the development of multilateral collaboration in various
 fields. It was also decided that economic collaboration should be developed within the
 Shanghai Five framework, particularly with respect to the energy sector. The five
 nations announced that they would be working to improve the investment and trade
 environment in their respective economies so as to create the conditions necessary for
 their citizens and enterprises to undertake normal commercial activity and solve any
 disputes that may arise during the collaboration process. The new model for regional
 collaboration established by the Shanghai Five has thus led to a deepening of
 collaboration in all areas, particularly economic development. Beside the original
 member nations, Uzbekistan has now been admitted to the SCO as a member. In the
 future, the governments of the nations concerned will be working together to promote
 economic collaboration based on mutual benefit in response to the challenges created
 by economic and financial globalisation.
 In response to the increased US presence in Central Asia following the 11
 September terrorist attacks, China has been leveraging the Shanghai Cooperation
 Organisation to facilitate bilateral military collaboration with the other member
 nations, while also working to strengthen the regional economic collaboration aspect
 of the SCO's activities. At the 2003 meeting of the SCO China proposed that it should
 work to facilitate trade and investment, with priority areas for economic cooperation
 to include transport, energy, telecommunications, agriculture, home appliances and
 light industry. In addition, China proposed the establishment of long-term objectives
 for regional economic collaboration and the gradual establishment of an SCO free
 trade zone.
 China has signed various inter-governmental economic collaboration agreements
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 with the Central Asian countries, the most important of which include agreements on
 economic and trade collaboration, the encouragement and mutual protection of
 investment, banking sector collaboration, road transport, rail transport, elimination of
 double taxation, combating tax evasion and collaboration in the petroleum sector.
 Inter-governmental committees have been formed to oversee collaboration in the
 areas of trade and technology; these committees provide a forum for regular
 consultation concerning economic and trade collaboration issues. The Central Asian
 nations hope that leading Chinese enterprises will establish factories in their countries
 or help develop local resources; in particular, they are hoping for Chinese investment
 in the transport, telecommunications, textiles, food, pharmaceutical, chemical, agricul-
 tural products processing, consumer goods production and machinery production
 sectors.
 In the last few years China has established embassies, trade offices and branches
 of the Xinhua news agency in all five of the Central Asian countries. The Bank of
 China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the General Administration of
 Civil Aviation of China have all established offices in Kazakhstan, while Kazakhstan
 has opened a visa office and civil aviation office in Urumqi, the provincial capital of
 Xinjiang. Xinjiang's main points of entry now all have comprehensive customs,
 inspection and quarantine functions, and the quality of warehousing, transport and
 customs clearance services and facilities are improving all the time. This has helped
 to establish a firm foundation for the development of the Central Asian market.
 The patterns and key features of bilateral trade
 According to Chinese government statistics, in 1992 the total value of import and
 export trade between China and the five Central Asian countries was US$464 million.
 As Table 1 shows, trade between Kazakhstan and China came to US$369 million,
 accounting for 20% of Kazakhstan's total foreign trade. The total value of China's
 trade with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in 1992 was
 US$52.52 million, US$35.48 million, US$4.5 million and US$2.75 million respect-
 ively. By 2002 the trade between China and the five Central Asian countries had
 grown to US$2.388 billion. Trade between China and Kazakhstan continued to
 account for the bulk of this, at US$1.955 billion, while the value of the trade between
 China and Uzbekistan and China and Kyrgyzstan was US$130 million and US$202
 million respectively.
 Looking at the structure of bilateral trade in terms of individual countries (see
 Tables 2 and 3), China's exports to Kazakhstan are mostly basic consumption goods,
 particularly labour-intensive products; hi-tech and high value added products account
 for a relatively small proportion of total exports. The main export products are shoes,
 clothing, machinery, electrical machinery, plastics, and iron and steel products. If one
 examines the changes in the structure of China's exports to Kazakhstan over the
 period 1995-2002 it can be seen that the proportion of exports held by footwear,
 clothing, machinery, electrical machinery and plastics has risen steadily. The products
 which China imports from Kazakhstan are mostly raw materials, including iron and
 steel, fertilisers, ores, copper, aluminium, cowhide and so on. There has been a similar
 tendency for the products that China imports from Kazakhstan to become more
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 TABLE 1
 BILATERAL TRADE BETWEEN CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIA (US $ 000)
 Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Total
 Trade volume 369,100 52,520 35,490 2,750 4,500 464,360
 1992 China's exports 227,930 38,890 18,850 1,950 4,090 291,710
 China's imports 141,170 13,630 16,640 800 410 172,650
 Trade volume 434,730 54,250 102,420 12,350 4,650 608,400
 1993 China's exports 171,690 42,800 36,550 6,480 3,850 261,370
 China's imports 263,040 11,460 65,870 5,880 800 347,050
 Trade volume 335,654 123,667 105,375 3,177 11,260 579,133
 1994 China's exports 138,689 51,458 29,925 675 3,669 224,416
 China's imports 196,965 72,209 75,450 2,502 7,591 354,717
 Trade volume 390,992 118,552 231,039 23,859 17,595 782,037
 1995 China's exports 75,447 47,566 107,498 14,617 11,267 256,395
 China's imports 315,545 70,986 123,541 9,242 6,328 525,642
 Trade volume 459,901 187,258 105,494 11,715 11,467 775,835
 1996 China's exports 95,306 38,154 68,678 7,640 8,452 218,230
 China's imports 364,596 149,104 36,816 4,075 3,015 557,606
 Trade volume 527,410 202,916 106,622 20,227 15,240 872,415
 1997 China's exports 94,628 61,528 70,601 11,045 11,633 249,435
 China's imports 432,782 141,388 36,021 9,182 3,606 622,979
 Trade volume 635,537 90,245 198,099 19,229 12,516 955,626
 1998 China's exports 204,681 57,883 172,406 11,042 10,293 456,305
 China's imports 430,856 32,362 25,692 8,187 2,223 499,320
 Trade volume 1,138,779 40,336 134,871 8,041 9,491 1,331,518
 1999 China's exports 494,375 27,388 102,899 2,298 7,468 634,428
 China's imports 644,404 12,948 31,972 5,743 2,023 697,090
 Trade volume 1,556,958 51,465 177,611 17,170 16,159 1,819,363
 2000 China's exports 598,749 39,432 110,174 6,793 12,102 767,250
 China's imports 958,209 12,033 67,437 10,377 4,057 1,052,113
 Trade volume 1,288,369 58,301 118,859 10,760 32,712 1,509,001
 2001 China's exports 327,719 50,684 76,639 5,308 31,488 491,838
 China's imports 960,651 7,617 42,221 5,452 1,224 1,017,165
 Trade volume 1,954,742 131,777 201,874 12,386 87,515 2,388,294
 2002 China's exports 600,097 104,374 146,156 6,501 86,780 943,908
 China's imports 1,354,645 27,403 55,718 5,886 735 1,444,387
 Source: China's Customs Statistics, 1992-2003.
 concentrated. If one looks at the main features of the way trade between China and
 Kazakhstan has developed over the last few years, it is clear that for most of the time
 China has run a trade deficit with Kazakhstan. The range of products being traded is
 narrow, and the trade is also very localised; Xinjiang accounts for around 80% of all
 China's trade with Kazakhstan.
 Bilateral trade between China and Uzbekistan developed rapidly after Uzbekistan
 gained independence, with the value of the trade between the two countries rising to
 US$203 million by 1997. In 1998, as a result of changes in demand in the two
 countries' domestic markets and the impact of the financial crisis in Russia, the
 volume of the trade fell dramatically, declining by 55.5% to US$90.25 million. In
 2002 the value of the trade between China and Uzbekistan was US$131 million;
 China's exports to Uzbekistan totaled US$104 million, while its imports from
 Uzbekistan totaled US$27.4 million. By 2002 China's main exports to Uzbekistan
 included machinery, optical and medical instruments, tea, coffee and electrical
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 TABLE 2
 CHINA'S IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA, 1995 AND 2002 (US$ MILLION AND %)
 HS Description 1995 % HS Description 2002 %
 Kazakhstan 315.55 100.00 1354.64 100.00
 72 Iron and steel 75.21 23.84 72 Iron and steel 546.95 40.38
 31 Fertilisers 51.64 16.37 74 Copper and articles thereof 448.07 33.08
 51 Animal hair and yarn,fabric 41.62 13.19 27 Mineral fuel, oil etc 170.46 12.58
 74 Copper and articles thereof 35.63 11.29 76 Aluminum 44.83 3.31
 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 35.36 11.21 79 Zinc and articles thereof 32.01 2.36
 41 Hides and skins 23.59 7.48 26 Ores,slag,ash 31.33 2.31
 76 Aluminum 19.81 6.28 28 Inorg chem;rare earth MT 30.18 2.23
 14 Other vegetable 18.32 5.81 41 Hides and skins 13.16 0.97
 26 Ores,slag,ash 6.07 1.93 31 Fertilisers 8.82 0.65
 84 Machinery 1.40 0.44 78 Lead 6.67 0.49
 Uzbekistan 70.99 100.00 27.40 100.00
 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 23.70 33.39 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 23.11 84.33
 14 Other vegetable 17.59 24.78 50 Silk and silk yarn,fabric 1.38 5.04
 31 Fertilisers 15.66 22.06 88 Aircraft,spacecraft 1.07 3.89
 51 Animal hair and 6.50 9.15 27 Mineral fuel, oil etc 0.88 3.23
 yarn,fabrc
 50 Silk and silk yarn,fabric 2.13 3.00 09 Spices,coffee and tea 0.25 0.92
 41 Hides and skins 1.69 2.38 14 Other vegetable 0.18 0.66
 74 Copper and articles 1.12 1.58 12 Misc,grain,seed,fruit 0.17 0.62
 thereof
 55 Man-made staple fibres 0.74 1.05 81 Other base metals etc. 0.16 0.60
 76 Aluminum 0.73 1.03 28 Inorg chem;rare earth MT 0.08 0.30
 29 Organic chemicals 0.46 0.64 61 Knit apparel 0.02 0.09
 Kyrgyzstan 123.54 100.00 55.72 100.00
 41 Hides and skins 30.91 25.02 76 Aluminum 19.16 34.38
 74 Copper and articles 30.70 24.85 72 Iron and steel 17.17 30.82
 thereof
 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 20.68 16.74 74 Copper and articles thereof 7.28 13.06
 51 Animal hair and 19.48 15.77 41 Hides and skins 7.05 12.66
 yarn,fabrc
 76 Aluminum 7.51 6.08 28 Inorg chem;rare earth MT 1.89 3.40
 72 Iron and steel 5.95 4.81 51 Animal hair and yarn,fabric 1.43 2.57
 50 Silk and silk yarn,fabric 2.89 2.34 50 Silk and silk yarn,fabric 0.74 1.33
 14 Other vegetable 2.63 2.13 08 Edible fruit and nuts 0.49 0.89
 31 Fertilisers 0.87 0.70 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 0.13 0.24
 81 Other base metals etc. 0.51 0.41 07 Vegetables 0.12 0.21
 Tajikistan 9.24 100.00 5.89 100.00
 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 4.27 46.19 72 Iron and steel 2.42 41.10
 14 Other vegetable 2.85 30.88 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 1.21 20.49
 26 Ores,slag,ash 0.63 6.79 76 Aluminum 1.20 20.33
 74 Copper and articles 0.58 6.27 50 Silk and silk yarn,fabric 0.58 9.86
 thereof
 51 Animal hair and 0.41 4.45 26 Ores,slag,ash 0.39 6.66
 yarn,fabric
 76 Aluminum 0.16 1.69 86 Railway;trf sign eq 0.04 0.71
 72 Iron and steel 0.12 1.26 14 Other vegetable 0.03 0.43
 41 Hides and skins 0.10 1.09 57 Textile floor coverings 0.02 0.42
 50 Silk and silk yarn,fabric 0.06 0.65 70 Glass and glassware 0.00 0.00
 42 Leather art;saddlery;bags 0.06 0.64 40 Rubber 0.00 0.00
 Turkmenistan 6.33 100.00 0.74 100.00
 14 Other vegetable 2.06 32.54 39 Plastic 0.21 28.92
 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 1.71 26.99 50 Silk and silk yarn,fabric 0.19 25.99
 74 Copper and articles 1.20 19.04 51 Animal hair and yarn,fabrc 0.09 11.83
 thereof
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 TABLE 2
 CHINA'S IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA, 1995 AND 2002 (US$ MILLION AND %)-continued
 HS Description 1995 % HS Description 2002 %
 51 Animal hair and 0.96 15.10 14 Other vegetable 0.08 10.20
 yarn,fabric
 56 Wadding,felt,twine,rope 0.12 1.91 41 Hides and skins 0.05 7.17
 50 Silk and silk yarn,fabric 0.12 1.85 12 Misc grain,seed,fruit 0.03 4.65
 41 Hides and skins 0.11 1.73 01 Live animals 0.02 3.14
 76 Aluminum 0.05 0.82 28 Inorg chem;rare earth MT 0.02 3.08
 72 Iron and steel 0.00 0.03 74 Copper and articles thereof 0.02 2.69
 54 Man-made filament fabric 0.00 0.00 13 Lac;vegetable sap,extract 0.01 1.98
 Source: China's Customs Statistics, 1996, 2003.
 machinery. Raw cotton, cotton yarn and cotton fabric accounted for 84.33% of
 China's imports from Uzbekistan.
 According to Chinese customs statistics, over the period 1992-2002 the value of
 the bilateral trade between China and Tajikistan rose from US$2.75 million to
 US$12.38 million. In 2002 China's exports to Tajikistan came to US$6.501 million,
 while its imports from Tajikistan totaled US$5.886 million. The main products being
 exported from China to Tajikistan in 2002 included electrical machinery, woven
 clothing, shoes and miscellaneous foodstuffs. The products that China imported from
 Tajikistan that year included iron and steel (41.1% of the total), cotton textiles and
 aluminium. At present, most of the trade between China and Tajikistan takes the form
 of small-scale trading by tourists. Both countries are hoping to achieve greater
 diversification in the bilateral trade between them.
 During the period 1992-2002 the value of the bilateral trade between China and
 Turkmenistan rose from US$4.5 million to US$87.515 million. The value of China's
 exports to Turkmenistan in 2002 was US$86.78 million, with the main export
 products including machinery, transport equipment and iron and steel products. The
 main products which China imported from Turkmenistan were plastics, silk, animal
 hides and fur, and vegetables.
 Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Kyrgyzstan
 bilateral trade between the two countries has grown rapidly, with considerable
 diversification. Besides trading links, China has also been participating actively in
 collaborative efforts on the production side. According to Chinese customs statistics,
 in 2002 the value of the bilateral trade between China and Kyrgyzstan was US$201
 million, representing 4.69-fold growth since 1992. China's exports to Kyrgyzstan rose
 from US$35.49 million to US$146 million over this period. Much of the growth in
 Chinese exports was due to the rapid development of collaborative projects focusing
 on technology. According to statistics produced by the Kyrgyzstan government, in
 2002 the share of the value of Chinese exports to Kyrgyzstan held by 'investment-
 type products' including machinery and materials used in Chinese companies'
 investments in Kyrgyzstan and their undertaking of construction work there rose to
 18%. China's main exports to Kyrgyzstan in 2002 included woven fabric, man-made
 fibre, footwear, plastics and machinery. The main products that China imported from
 Kyrgyzstan were aluminium, iron and steel, copper, and animal hides and skins.
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 The trade between China and the nations of Central Asia is not limited to
 conventional international trade but takes a variety of forms, including tourist trading,
 conventional border trade and small-scale exchange between the inhabitants of the
 TABLE 3
 CHINA'S EXPORTS TO CENTRAL ASIA, 1995 AND 2002 (US$ MILLION AND %)
 HS Description 1995 % HS Description 2002 %
 Kazakhstan 11.27 100.00 86.78 100.00
 22 Beverages 4.08 36.19 84 Machinery 64.42 74.23
 58 Spcl woven fabric,etc 2.35 20.87 87 Vehicles, not railway 4.86 5.61
 64 Footwear 1.46 13.00 73 Iron/steel products 4.60 5.30
 84 Machinery 0.91 8.09 85 Electrical machinery 3.01 3.47
 90 Optic,NT 8544;med instr 0.38 3.36 61 Knit apparel 3.00 3.45
 96 Miscellaneous manufact 0.28 2.44 64 Footwear 2.08 2.39
 09 Spices,coffee and tea 0.23 2.08 09 Spices,coffee and tea 1.82 2.09
 61 Knit apparel 0.21 1.86 05 Other of animal origin 0.47 0.54
 62 Woven apparel 0.19 1.67 94 Furniture and bedding 0.45 0.52
 17 Sugars 0.16 1.43 68 Stone,plaster,cement,etc 0.45 0.52
 Uzbekistan 47.57 100.00 104.21 100.00
 22 Beverages 9.35 19.65 84 Machinery 37.95 36.42
 84 Machinery 6.63 13.94 90 Optic,NT 8544;med instr 15.62 14.99
 63 Misc textile articles 6.63 13.93 09 Spices,coffee and tea 8.73 8.38
 85 Electrical machinery 4.47 9.40 39 Plastic 7.69 7.38
 62 Woven apparel 3.62 7.62 85 Electrical machinery 5.06 4.86
 64 Footwear 2.72 5.73 87 Vehicles, not railway 4.34 4.16
 61 Knit apparel 2.38 5.01 61 Knit apparel 3.25 3.12
 39 Plastic 1.67 3.51 28 Inorg chem;rare earth MT 3.03 2.91
 90 Optic,NT 8544;med instr 1.17 2.46 62 Woven apparel 2.46 2.36
 29 Organic chemicals 0.95 1.99 29 Organic chemicals 1.67 1.60
 Kyrgyzstan 107.50 100.00 146.16 100.00
 58 Spcl woven fabric,etc 31.95 29.72 58 Spcl woven fabric,etc 31.49 21.54
 22 Beverages 16.65 15.49 55 Manmade staple fibres 15.15 10.36
 61 Knit apparel 13.10 12.19 64 Footwear 14.84 10.16
 62 Woven apparel 12.21 11.36 39 Plastic 8.96 6.13
 54 Man-made filament,fabric 5.04 4.69 84 Machinery 8.57 5.87
 64 Footwear 4.94 4.60 54 Man-made filament,fabric 7.83 5.36
 84 Machinery 3.92 3.65 61 Knit apparel 6.52 4.46
 55 Manmade staple fibres 3.56 3.31 28 Inorg chem;rare earth MT 4.76 3.26
 52 Cotton and yarn,fabric 2.93 2.73 83 Misc art of base metal 4.30 2.94
 39 Plastic 1.33 1.24 85 Electrical machinery 3.70 2.53
 Tajikistan 14.62 100.00 6.50 100.00
 84 Machinery 3.18 21.77 85 Electrical machinery 2.45 37.63
 62 Woven apparel 2.95 20.21 62 Woven apparel 0.74 11.31
 22 Beverages 2.23 15.26 64 Footwear 0.64 9.84
 64 Footwear 1.35 9.22 21 Miscellaneous food 0.46 7.07
 61 Knit apparel 1.33 9.10 09 Spices,coffee and tea 0.31 4.80
 34 Soap,wax,ET dental prep 1.12 7.69 39 Plastic 0.23 3.49
 55 Manmade staple fibres 0.55 3.74 84 Machinery 0.22 3.39
 85 Electrical machinery 0.40 2.71 94 Furniture and bedding 0.22 3.38
 09 Spices,coffee and tea 0.30 2.08 26 Ores,slag,ash 0.17 2.63
 28 Inorg chem;rare earth MT 0.26 1.81 61 Knit apparel 0.15 2.33
 Turkmenistan 11.27 100.00 86.78 100.00
 22 Beverages 4.08 36.19 84 Machinery 64.42 74.23
 58 Spcl woven fabric,etc 2.35 20.87 87 Vehicles, not railway 4.86 5.61
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 TABLE 3
 CHINA'S EXPORTS TO CENTRAL ASIA, 1995 AND 2002 (US$ MILLION AND %)-continued
 HS Description 1995 % HS Description 2002 %
 64 Footwear 1.46 13.00 73 Iron/steel products 4.60 5.30
 84 Machinery 0.91 8.09 85 Electrical machinery 3.01 3.47
 90 Optic,NT 8544;med instr 0.38 3.36 61 Knit apparel 3.00 3.45
 96 Miscellaneous manufact 0.28 2.44 64 Footwear 2.08 2.39
 09 Spices,coffee and tea 0.23 2.08 09 Spices,coffee and tea 1.82 2.09
 61 Knit apparel 0.21 1.86 05 Other of animal origin 0.47 0.54
 62 Woven apparel 0.19 1.67 94 Furniture and bedding 0.45 0.52
 17 Sugars 0.16 1.43 68 Stone,plastr,cement,etc 0.45 0.52
 Source: China's Customs Statistics, 1996, 2003.
 border regions. Many Chinese and Central Asian trading organisations have estab-
 lished companies, shops and offices in border areas so that buyers and sellers can
 negotiate face to face; this makes it possible to complete transactions rapidly and
 conveniently. The highest level of convenience is found in the small-scale trading
 between border region inhabitants. Since opening in August 1992 the market
 established for inhabitants of the border area at Khorgos, on the border between
 Kazakhstan and China, has recorded an average monthly transaction volume of
 RMB200,000.
 Enterprises with their headquarters in Xinjiang play a very important role in trade
 between China and Central Asia. This is partly due to the emphasis the Chinese
 government has placed on border trade. Under the border trade policy, the govern-
 ment encourages China's border regions to develop economic collaboration with
 neighbouring nations; the idea is that this will help to create prosperity and stability
 in the border regions, while also reducing the disparities that currently exist between
 different areas of China (Womack, 2001). The main features of this policy are as
 follows (Ji, 2003).
 1. Exchange between inhabitants of the border region is limited to an area within 20
 km of the border, and is restricted to the exchange of commodities up to a
 specified value at locations approved by the government. Small-scale border trade
 comprises trading activities undertaken by authorised enterprises in approved
 counties and cities lying along the border and authorised enterprises located close
 to the border region.
 2. With the exception of exchange between inhabitants of the border region, all other
 types of border trade that may currently exist will eventually be incorporated into
 small-scale border trade for the purposes of administration and policy formulation.
 In principle, there will be no restrictions based on the type of trade. This will make
 it possible for enterprises engaging in border trade to develop new business areas
 using flexible, diversified trading methods, and to integrate their activities with
 both the Chinese domestic market and overseas markets.
 3. China imposes quotas or a permit system on border trade exports but products will
 not be subject to quotas or permit requirements within the national export plan. In
 the case of products for which China imposes import quotas or an import permit
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 system, the state will allocate a special import quota to the border region every
 year, and the provincial government department with responsibility for foreign
 trade will issue an import permit. In the case of goods brought into the country
 through border region economic and technology collaboration projects, engineer-
 ing contracts or the provision of labour services, these goods may be imported
 according to the regular procedures for the item in question, with no restrictions.
 Within limits, exports of production equipment and materials will not be subject
 to export quota restrictions and no export permit will be required.
 4. Tariffs and import turnover tax will be reduced by half for border trade; up to a
 certain value, exchange between inhabitants of the border region will be exempted
 from customs duty completely. This measure has been implemented by the central
 government in response to decisions made at the local level to exempt goods from
 import duty or import turnover tax; the aim is to support the economic develop-
 ment of the border regions.
 China's border trade policy has great significance for the economic development of
 the border areas. It provides favourable conditions for stimulating economic collabo-
 ration in the border regions, and should breathe new life into the small-scale border
 trade that has been taking place in these regions. By easing the problems that people
 have experienced crossing the border and making procedures less complicated, the
 policy creates incentives for economic and technical collaboration in the border areas.
 The main objective of China's border trade policy is to maintain stability in the
 border areas and encourage the development of friendly relations with neighbouring
 states. The inhabitants of China's border regions include a large number of different
 minority peoples; in order to keep separatist sentiment to a minimum and maintain
 stability in these areas, while at the same time promoting economic development, the
 Chinese government is prepared to give the border regions special treatment.
 The Chinese province of Xinjiang shares a 3,500 km long border with the Central
 Asian countries. Xinjiang's geographical location makes it the obvious channel for
 contacts between China and Central Asia, with potential benefits both for Xinjiang
 and the Central Asian nations. China is taking Xinjiang as the base and using border
 trade incentive measures to encourage the development of economic ties with the five
 Central Asian countries in response to the growing geopolitical importance of Central
 Asia (Loughlin & Pannell, 2001; Spechler, 2003). To sum up, Central Asia is
 geopolitically important to China in three respects: (1) China has become an oil
 importer nation; Central Asia has extensive oil fields lying close to China. Whether
 or not China is able to maintain easy access to these oil fields will have a major
 impact on the country's future development; (2) China is currently implementing the
 Great Western Development project to stimulate economic development in western
 China. Stable conditions in the border regions are vital if this project is to be a
 success. If Central Asia were to become unstable, or if China were to lose its ability
 to influence events in the region, this would have a negative impact on China's overall
 national development strategy; and (3) there has been collaboration between terrorist
 groups in Central Asia and the separatist movement in Xinjiang, threatening the
 stability of China's western borders. China hopes that by promoting the growth of
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 economic ties with the five Central Asian countries it can increase the amount of
 influence it is able to exercise in the area.
 Assessment of Chinese investment in Central Asia
 In 1992 an important new transport link between Asia and Europe began operation
 with the extension of the railway from Urumqi in Xinjiang through the Altaw pass
 into Kazakhstan. Both passenger and freight services began in September 1992; the
 opening of this section of railway line brought the Central Asian nations much closer
 to Lianyungang, one of the most important ports on China's east coast, and is thus
 of great significance for the development of economic collaboration between China
 and Central Asia. Historically, Xinjiang and Central Asia have played an important
 role in linking East and West. Now, with the implementing of economic reforms in
 both regions, collaboration between them in the economic, technical and social
 spheres is being strengthened; Xinjiang and the five Central Asian countries are
 coming together to form an important new Central Asian economic zone with great
 potential which can be expected to attract investment from enterprises in many
 different countries. Although the amount of direct investment in the Central Asian
 countries by China is still relatively small (see Table 4), given the extensive natural
 resources the Central Asia nations possess the volume of investment is bound to
 increase. The current state of Chinese investment in the Central Asian countries will
 now be briefly surveyed.
 Kazakhstan
 According to China's Almanac of China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, at
 the end of 2002 the total amount of Chinese investment in Kazakhstan approved by
 the Chinese government was US$39,601,300, with the number of enterprises involved
 totaling 51. According to statistics produced by Kazakhstan's investment commission,
 more than 1,000 Chinese-invested enterprises (including joint ventures, wholly-owned
 subsidiaries of Chinese companies and representative offices) have been registered in
 Kazakhstan since 1992; however, less than 100 are still engaged in production or
 trading activities, with more than 20 being representative offices. Chinese investment
 in Kazakhstan totals around US$800 million, with the main sectors invested in being
 petroleum and natural gas, banking, food processing, construction materials and car
 assembly.2 China accounts for 4.4% of total foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan,
 putting it in sixth place behind the US, the UK, South Korea, Italy and Canada. Some
 of the more significant Chinese-invested companies in Kazakhstan include the China
 National Petroleum Corporation, the Kazakh-China Bank, the Almaty-China Com-
 mercial Bank, the representative office of Xinjiang Airlines, the Nikar joint-venture
 tobacco-rolling plant and the Xinkang tomato sauce factory.
 Uzbekistan
 China's Almanac of China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade showed that, at the
 end of 2002, the total amount of Chinese investment in Uzbekistan approved by the
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 TABLE 4
 CHINESE OUTWARD FDI STOCK IN FIVE CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES (US $ 000)
 Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan
 Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese Chinese
 Number of investment Number of investment Number of investment Number of investment Number of investment
 projects value projects value projects value projects value projects value
 1992 6 1,164.0 5 3,647.0 3 3,363.0 1 1,200.0 0 0.0
 1993 5 2,167.0 2 300.0 1 180.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 1994 1 255.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 1995 1 102.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 1996 0 0.0 1 208.0 2 402.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 1997 1 480.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 1998 11 6,127.0 9 3,643.0 6 6,716.0 2 1,880.0 2 300.0
 1999 7 17,210.0 0 0.0 4 1,790.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 2000 5 7,734.0 3 1,139.0 4 10,381.2 0 0.0 0 0.0
 2001 1 307.0 2 532.5 2 1,754.6 1 50.0 0 0.0
 2002 3 2,690.0 4 3,731.5 3 1,396.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
 Up to 2002 51 39,601.3 29 12,923.0 29 24,252.8 8 3,390.0 2 300.0
 Source: Almanac of China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 1993-2003.
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 Chinese government was US$12,923,000, with a total of 29 enterprises involved.
 According to statistics released by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are 106
 Chinese-invested companies registered in Uzbekistan, with the total amount invested
 being around US$6 million.3 The vast majority of these companies are small in size,
 with most of them being trading companies. Those companies which are involved in
 production are mainly engaged in light industry, electronics manufacturing or agricul-
 tural production. Government policy in Uzbekistan has tended to be rather capricious,
 and strict foreign exchange controls have been imposed, making it difficult for foreign
 investors to transfer profits back to their home country. Transport is another problem;
 there are no direct transport links between China and Uzbekistan, so goods must be
 transported by road via Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. This tends to make Chinese
 companies less enthusiastic about investing in Uzbekistan. While some Chinese-in-
 vested companies-such as the Harbin Xiandai Group, which has established
 liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and water meter factories in Tashkent-are still
 operating normally, most Chinese-invested firms have ceased production.
 Tajikistan
 According to China's Almanac of China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, at
 the end of 2002 the total value of Chinese investment in Tajikistan approved by the
 Chinese government was US$3.39 million, with eight enterprises involved. Data
 produced by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that in June 2003 there were
 eight Chinese-invested companies operating normally in Tajikistan, including a
 representative office of Shenzhen Zhongxing Telecom Equipment Corporation (ZTE)
 (responsible for implementation of a foreign aid programme and the provision of
 related equipment), the Lishida yarn factory (a Chinese-Tajik joint venture), the
 Dushanbe tobacco-rolling plant (another joint venture), the You Yi Agricultural
 Development Corporation, the Kashi Agricultural Development Company (a wholly-
 owned subsidiary of a Chinese company) and several restaurants. While the Lishida
 yarn factory, the Dushanbe tobacco-rolling plant, the You Yi Agricultural Develop-
 ment Corporation and the Kashi Agricultural Development Company are registered
 with China's Ministry of Commerce, most of the other enterprises have been
 established by individual Chinese entrepreneurs; in some cases they are not even
 registered with the Tajik authorities.4
 ZTE's representative office in Tajikistan is responsible for overhauling the commu-
 nications network in Tajikistan, a project being funded by the European Bank for
 Reconstruction and Development and the Swiss government with loans to the value
 of US$15 million. In addition, the Chinese government has provided Tajikistan with
 a development grant of RMB8 million for the installation of telephone switching and
 code division multiple access (CDMA) equipment to be installed in the Tadanjila
 region; implementation of this project has also been entrusted to ZTE. The Lishida
 yarn factory is a joint venture established with financing from the Export-Import
 Bank of China. The factory has a total capitalisation of US$9.74 million, with the
 Chinese partner having a 19% share (provision of technical services) and the Tajik
 partner 81% (equipment, plant buildings and working capital). It has proved difficult
 to develop the yarn market in Tajikistan, and there have been problems with
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 inexperienced managers; the factory has been making a loss, with the Tajik partner
 unable to repay its debts. Owing to a shortage of parts needed to repair the production
 equipment, the factory has now ceased production.
 The Dushanbe tobacco-rolling plant, another Sino-Tajik joint venture, was estab-
 lished in 1994 with a RMB50 million loan from the Chinese government, which also
 provided technical assistance. The company has registered capital of US$300,000,
 with the Chinese partner having a 10% share and the Tajik partner 90%; the
 joint-venture agreement has a term of 30 years. Several years on, the factory is still
 experiencing problems; in July 2003 it was producing two competing brands of
 cigarette. Daily production volume is 80 cartons (800,000 cigarettes).
 The Kashi Agricultural Development Company is a trading company established in
 1997 as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Xinjiang Production and Construction
 Corporation. It is mainly involved in the import and export of small electromechanical
 machinery, scrap metal, silkworms, short-staple cotton, leather and so on. Recently,
 the company has used Xinjiang Production and Construction Corporation funding to
 invest RMB500,000 in the establishment of a water purification plant in Dushanbe;
 the plant now produces 10 tons of bottled water a day. Production began in May 2003
 and the company is marketing the water aggressively. The You Yi Agricultural
 Development Corporation is mainly involved in implementation of a Chinese govern-
 ment aid project to introduce drip irrigation for cotton cultivation in Tajikistan.
 Turkmenistan
 According to China's Almanac of China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, at
 the end of 2002 the total value of Chinese investment in Turkmenistan approved by
 the Chinese government was US$300,000, with only two enterprises involved. The
 biggest collaborative project is the agreement signed in 1997 whereby China National
 Petroleum Corporation undertook to repair 100 oil wells in Turkmenistan; the value
 of the contract was US$27 million. In 2000 the government of Turkmenistan asked
 China National Petroleum Corporation to take on the repair of another 100 oil wells.
 Kyrgyzstan
 China's Almanac of China Foreign Economic Relations and Trade showed the total
 value of Chinese investment in Kyrgyzstan approved by the Chinese government as
 US$24,252,800 at the end of 2002, with 29 enterprises involved. According to data
 produced by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are approximately 384
 Chinese-invested companies registered in Kyrgyzstan, of which just over 150 are
 actually operational.5 The industries in which these companies are involved include
 import-export trade, construction, agricultural production, the restaurant business,
 processing of agricultural products and the chemical industry. Segments of the local
 economy in which China has come to play a significant role include paper-mill
 operation, pig raising and bag manufacturing. Recently, Chinese investment in the
 manufacturing sector has started to increase gradually, making for more diversified
 investment; thus demand for Chinese production equipment has increased.
 Beginning in 1992 all five of the newly independent Central Asian countries
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 announced that they would be opening their markets, aiming to attract foreign
 investment and expand foreign trade in the process of institutional transformation.
 Central Asia's main attraction to foreign investors is its abundant natural resources
 (Spechler, 2000; Deichmann et al., 2003), such as Kazakhstan's oil and natural gas
 and Kyrgyzstan's gold mines. The Central Asian nations have made changes to their
 legal systems to demonstrate their commitment to market opening. 1991 saw the
 promulgation of Kazakhstan's Foreign Investment Law, Basic Law Governing For-
 eign Economic Activity and Law Governing Free Economic Zones, Uzbekistan's
 Law Governing Foreign Economic Activity and Free Economic Zone Law, and
 Kyrgyzstan's Foreign Investment Law. These were followed in 1992 by the Basic
 Law Governing Foreign Economic Activity, Free Economic Zone Law and Law
 Governing Rental by Foreign Companies in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan's Foreign
 Investment Law.
 As the process of economic transformation in the Central Asian countries contin-
 ued, there have been major changes to the laws governing foreign trade and foreign
 investment since 1995; for example, Kazakhstan promulgated a new Foreign Invest-
 ment Law in 2003 to replace its existing law.6 Nevertheless, these various laws
 relating to foreign trade and foreign investment tended to lack the necessary
 ancillary measures and implementation regulations; as a result, in practical terms
 they achieved little. The legal framework seemed to be changing all the time,
 making it difficult for foreign investors to ensure that their rights were protected.
 With the complex mix of legal traditions that existed in the Central Asian nations
 and the long period of political and economic instability that followed indepen-
 dence, the legal framework for economic activity remained highly unsatisfactory; in
 some countries there was no clear legislation governing trans-national technology
 transfer, transport, protection of foreign intellectual property rights or judicial reme-
 dies. Another problem was the lack of ancillary measures, such as technical stan-
 dards and tariff standards. The weakness of the legal framework tended to foster
 abuse of power and corruption.
 Besides the problems relating to the legal system, there were several other areas
 in which the Central Asian countries were not competitive, leading to a loss of
 confidence on the part of foreign investors, namely:
 1. The process of institutional transformation meant that domestic enterprises in the
 Central Asian nations found themselves competing against foreign companies. The
 domestic companies were usually extremely uncompetitive, with low labour
 efficiency, low quality standards and an absence of innovation.
 2. The bureaucratism that had become such a feature of life in the Central Asian
 countries was difficult to eradicate. Corruption and bribe taking were widespread,
 discouraging both foreign investment and domestic entrepreneurial activity.
 3. The Central Asian nations' industries were oriented mainly towards the production
 of raw materials. The level of technology in manufacturing industry was low,
 production machinery was old and decrepit, and labour costs were high relative to
 other developing nations. This made it difficult to attract foreign investment.
 4. The Central Asian countries' location in the middle of the Eurasian landmass gave
 them strategic significance, but it also restricted their access to maritime transport.
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 5. Central Asia lacks effective democratic institutions, and there is a high potential
 for inter-ethnic conflict. Social attitudes tend to be conservative, and Islamic
 fundamentalism is on the rise (Akbarzadeh, 2001; Zardykhan, 2002). These factors
 are detrimental to economic development and discourage foreign investment.
 As regards the process of institutional transformation itself, in the future the key
 factors affecting Central Asian economic development will be structural reform and
 macroeconomic management. Structural reform includes market liberalisation, price
 adjustment, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and the establishment of fiscal,
 judicial and administrative systems that will allow the market economy to operate
 properly. As for macroeconomic management, the main issues here are how to make
 effective use of both domestic and international funds and secure assistance from
 international agencies.
 Conclusions
 As economies in transition, market opening is an important policy for both China and
 the five Central Asian countries. The Central Asian nations need to revitalise their
 economies; they are hoping to secure the technology, funds and development aid
 needed to achieve their economic development goals, and as a result they have all
 taken the basic steps necessary for market opening and economic collaboration. In the
 aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks, China has decided to focus on the
 development of trade and investment links as the best means of increasing its
 influence over the five Central Asian countries.
 Xinjiang is in close geographical proximity to the Central Asian nations and
 provides a convenient artery for China's development of the Central Asian market.
 Many of Xinjiang's inhabitants share the same languages and customs as the peoples
 of Central Asia, putting Xinjiang at an advantage when it comes to developing trading
 relations with Central Asia. At the same time, the Chinese government has begun
 implementation of the Great Western Development plan, which focuses particularly
 on Xinjiang. This means that the central government will be providing Xinjiang with
 extensive support in terms of manpower, material, finance, technology and policy
 tools, thereby facilitating further development in the region. Central Asia is already
 becoming more dependent on products manufactured in eastern China, and the
 importance of the Central Asian market to China's coastal regions is rising. With
 enterprises in the coastal regions eager to develop the Central Asian market, the Great
 Western Development project will provide an opportunity for further strengthening of
 the collaboration between China and Central Asia.
 In the last ten years the volume of trade between China and Central Asia, and
 Chinese investment in the region, have grown rapidly. The comparative advantages
 that China and Central Asia possess are complementary to one another, and there is
 considerable potential for increased collaboration in the economic sphere in the
 future. However, if further progress is to be made in the development of economic
 integration between China and Central Asia, there are several problems that will need
 to be overcome.
 First, the various agreements that have grown out of the SCO will not in themselves
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 be sufficient to achieve the long-term objectives of regional economic collaboration.
 The agreements that have been signed so far do not specify clear long-term objectives
 for regional economic integration or a timetable for their implementation, nor do they
 specify the mechanisms for implementing and safeguarding the liberalisation and
 facilitation of trade and investment. This raises the question of how the SCO will go
 about coordinating and monitoring the implementation of the various related measures
 by its member nations. Furthermore, the existing agreements make no reference to
 key issues such as tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, market opening and achieving
 transparency in trade and investment policy.
 Second, the SCO member nations have differing attitudes with respect to collabo-
 ration and the building of regional economic integration. Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
 gyzstan and Tajikistan have made little effort to keep to the timetable for trade and
 investment facilitation laid down in the existing agreements between these nations.
 The Central Asian nations feel that the agreements signed so far do not fully reflect
 their needs with regard to economic collaboration. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
 Tajikistan want more in the way of trade and investment facilitation than China has
 been willing to agree to so far; they consider the scope of multilateral economic
 collaboration that China has been discussing to be too limited.
 Third, there are conflicts of interest between the SCO member nations. Russia
 wants to ensure that it will have a leading role in regional economic collaboration.
 Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are all members of the Eurasian
 Economic Community (EEC) which Russia heads. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
 Tajikistan are all at a relatively low level of economic development and suffer from
 a shortage of capital; the main focus of economic collaboration would thus be
 on attracting Chinese investment, or on collaborating with Chinese companies to
 develop natural resources. Russia is thus concerned that China will become too
 influential within the SCO and will come to dominate the organisation, thereby
 reducing the level of influence Russia is able to exercise over the Central Asian
 nations. There is also some conflict of interest over the development of energy
 sources. The Central Asian nations want to set their own prices for oil exports and
 control the channels by which oil is exported from their countries, but Russia refuses
 to allow this.
 On 28 February 2002 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan estab-
 lished the Central Asian Co-operation Organisation (CACO), formed from the former
 Central Asian Economic Community. By giving preferential treatment to one another
 in various areas, the member nations of CACO hoped to promote economic collabo-
 ration in Central Asia. At the same time, there has been considerable development in
 the border trade between Xinjiang and the five Central Asian countries and in
 economic and technical collaboration between Xinjiang-based companies and these
 republics. Border Region Economic Co-operation Zones have been set up in the Ili,
 Bole and Tacheng regions. The trade between China and Central Asia is no longer
 confined to Xinjiang; it now also embraces other parts of northwest China, the interior
 of China and the coastal regions. However, China has yet to sign any concrete
 collaborative agreements with the Central Asian nations covering economic develop-
 ment in the region as a whole. By comparison with the situation in other regional
 economic organisations, therefore, the development of economic collaboration be-
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 tween China and Central Asia is still in the early stages. The market mechanism is
 still not operating satisfactorily in either Xinjiang or the five Central Asian countries,
 and no organisation has been established to undertake arbitration in the event of trade
 disputes. These problems will tend to slow the pace of economic integration.
 Tamkang University
 Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research
 'Since the early 1990s the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has actively supported the Central
 Asia Regional Economic Cooperation initiative (Shin, 2002).
 2 The data are produced by Kazakhstan's investment commission. The discrepancy between the
 amount of approved Chinese investment and realised investment in the host country arises because
 some investment items do not conform to the Chinese government ordinance and are not declared for
 approval by the Chinese government. Moreover, differences in statistical methods and basis in
 different countries may cause discrepancies between data produced by two countries.
 3 See < http;//www.fmprc.gov.cn/ >, 5 January 2004. The data released by China's Ministry of
 Foreign Affairs are based on the information collected in the host country.
 See < http;//tj.mofcom.gov.cn/ >, 6 January 2004.
 5 See < http;//www.fmprc.gov.cn/ > , 3 January 2004.
 6 See < http;//www.bisnis.doc.gov/>, 3 February 2003.
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